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David Singh Grewal
Most serious studies of "globalization" quickly derail into simple
analyses of the immediately identifiable global institutions and
actors, with little inquiry into the deeper interrelationships animating
them. We associate globalization with increased trade,' or broader
cross-cultural contact,' or perhaps with "Americanization,"3 but none
1. Both critics and proponents of "globalization" understand trade-economic
"openness" -as key to globalization. See, e.g., PHILIPPE AGHION & JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON,
GROWTH, INEQUALITY, AND GLOBALIZATION: THEORY, HISTORY, AND POLICY (1998);
KEVIN H. O'ROURKE & JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, GLOBALIZATION AND HISTORY: THE
EVOLUTION OF A NINETEENTH-CENTURY ATLANTIC ECONOMY (1999). For a critical view,
see DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? (1997).
2. Consider the flurry of recent work in political and cultural theory assessing new
demands for cultural recognition, in multicultural societies and in global discourse more
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of these fits precisely. What we lack is an analysis of globalization
that inquires into the deeper currents transforming the contem-
porary world.
In a provocative answer to that lack, Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri's Empire constructs a sweeping, theoretically rich account of
the nature of globalization. Hardt and Negri argue that we live in a
new global hegemony, which they call "Empire," a system of govern-
ing principles without bounds, neoliberalism ascendant.' In calling
the emerging global order "Empire," they seek to evoke the world of
ancient Rome rather than the European imperialist projects of
recent centuries.' Unlike those nation-based empires, our current
world order more closely resembles the ancient empires, understood
as moral and legal frameworks operative over an expansive, fluctuat-
ing territory. Similarly, Empire has no demarcated territory: it is
characterized by a denial of limits, territorial or otherwise, to its ex-
pansion.
Hardt and Negri explore this "Empire" in its many forms: its
emerging international legal order with its challenge to conventional
national sovereignty; 6 its economy, based on new forms of network-
ed, global production; its politics with new sources of legitimacy and
power. In so doing, they outline an unconventional intellectual
history of modernity, from the Renaissance to the late twentieth cen-
tury. They also explore in detail the new "subjectivities"-the forms
of identity and self-understanding-that emerge in Empire, situating
their argument within ongoing postmodern and post-Marxist dis-
courses. Analysis on such a grand scale necessarily borrows much
from others, particularly contemporary European social theorists.7
broadly. See, e.g., ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF
GLOBALIZATION (1995); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THE-
ORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999); CHARLES
TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION: AN ESSAY (Amy Gut-
man ed., 1992). Such important work in political and cultural theory rarely makes its way into
more popular treatises on "globalization."
3. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: HOW GLOBALIZATION IS RESHAPING
OUR LIVES 33 (2000).
4. Alain Touraine has argued that the movement against "globalization" should really be a
contest over global neoliberalism. See ALAIN TOURAINE, BEYOND NEOLIBERALISM (2001).
See also JOHN GRAY, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1998).
5. On the history of different forms of empire and imperial expansion, see, for example,
MICHAEL W. DOYLE, EMPIRES (1986); ANTHONY PAGDEN, PEOPLES AND EMPIRES (2001).
6. Hardt and Negri's analysis of the decline of national sovereignty borrows from the work
of sociologist Saskia Sassen, among others. See SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOV-
EREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).
7. They are indebted particularly to Michel Foucault, from whom they borrow such ideas
as biopower, and to Deleuze and Guattari, whose theoretical approach Hardt and Negri adopt
in considering globalization. See GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATITARI, A THOUSAND PLA-
TEAUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA (1987); 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY (1988), Hardt and Negri's theory of sovereignty is borrowed from GIORGIO
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The resulting argument is complex and nuanced, but sometimes
difficult to follow and maddeningly impenetrable.
The book has its problems, and the central arguments can be lost
in poorly considered prose and a style at once highly abstract and
bombastic. In one passage, we are encouraged to recognize ourselves
as the "simians and cyborgs we are,"' and elsewhere, we are told of
the "joy of being a communist."9 Frequently, the reader is subjected
to awkward, jargonistic prose that no high theoretic commitments
can justify. The shame is that the argument hidden by such language
merits consideration.
LOGICS OF EMPIRE
Hardt and Negri argue that Empire constitutes a form of govern-
ance without government. Where Empire expands, it replicates a
series of social orderings without relying on a territorial core. Empire
consists of various "logics" - for example, the logic of capital, the
logic of police intervention, and the logic of networked or post-in-
dustrial production." These logics can be established anywhere, thus
breaking down the old distinction between core and periphery in
favor of a resolutely global terrain; they do not depend on any exist-
ing political or juridical formation, such as United States military
power or the World Trade Organization, even as they motivate the
creation of these institutions and articulate their purposes.
Framing the argument in terms of globalizing logics puts national
sovereignty in the background, but Hardt and Negri do not see states
as actors playing a game whose rules they cannot control.1 Rather,
they resuscitate Polybius's vision of the tripartite constitution of the
Roman Empire and update it to the present day, suggesting a "pyra-
mid of global constitution." 2 In their version, the monarchical power
consists of the United States monopoly on military force and the G-7
AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (1998), a complex and inter-
esting book adapting Carl Schmitt's idea of sovereignty and Arendt's and Foucault's visions of
political life to describe the current world political order. See CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL
THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (1985).
8. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 92 (2000).
9. Id. at 413.
10. Hardt and Negri claim that the world is being integrated "by conforming to the struc-
tural logics that are active in the construction of Empire, such as the police and military logics
(or really the repression of potential subversive forces in the context of imperial peace), the
economic logics (the imposition of the market, which in turn is ruled by the monetary regime),
and the ideological and communicative logics." Id. at 341.
11. See, e.g., GIDDENS, supra note 3, and SASSEN, supra note 6.
12. The argument is not that this constitution consists of "ordering elements" but "ma-
trixes that delimit relatively coherent horizons in the disorder of global juridical and political
life." The pyramid is, in other words, a metaphor and analytic tool more than a description of a
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monopoly over the terms of global monetary policy and exchange.
The aristocratic function, made up of nation-states and multinational
corporations, distributes monarchical control broadly across the
world. The people are represented in the pyramid through represen-
tative organizations-NGOs, the media, certain global forums-
which constitute the "popular" function.13 In this more complex ren-
dering, Hardt and Negri reject both the state-centered view of tradi-
tional analysis and the pervading critical view, which often imagines
globalization as a straightforward expansion of corporate power
overtaking the state." However, perhaps more attracted by the
aesthetics of this concept than its analytics, they do never clearly de-
lineate the nature of the interlinkages between these functions of the
pyramidal constitution of Empire.
Empire's Juridical Structure
The description of the new global order as "Empire" implies a
post-national conception of sovereignty, which Hardt and Negri see
developing out of the demand for international interventions and the
necessity of supranational juridical scaffolding that is capable of sup-
porting such interventions. As they explain, "All conflicts, all crises,
and all dissensions effectively push forward the process of integra-
tion and by the same measure call for more central authority.
1 5
Thus, the military interventions in Kosovo, the IMF bailout of Indo-
nesia and Thailand during the 'East Asian Crisis,' and recent human-
itarian missions in Africa are all justified on a new, explicitly supra-
national morality, supported by discourses that both draw on and
reinforce our sense of global community and international inter-
dependence. As they put it, "moral intervention has become a front-
line force of imperial intervention."'6
Consider an exemplary current example, the global anti-terror
campaign of the United States, "Operation Enduring Freedom," a
transnational mission against a diffuse and shifting enemy in which
all states must decide, as President Bush has put it, whether they are
with America or "with the terrorists."'" This multifaceted operation
13. Hardt and Negri treat all NGOs as complicit in the imperial order. In doing so,
however, they neglect the enormous proliferation of grassroots NGOs (particularly in the
developing world), without links to transnational media, foundations, or international organi-
zations. Their blanket dismissal seems particularly unfounded, given the deeply reformist aims
they suggest for "counter-imperial" action. See infra text accompanying notes 31-33.
14. See, for example, DAVID KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD (1995),
for this latter view.
15. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 14.
16. Id at 36.
17. In his September 20, 2001 address following the events of September 11, President
Bush stated, "Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us
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pushes forward international integration, not only in the military
cooperation it demands, but also in the articulation of national poli-
cies and rhetoric and the drive to incorporate the entire world into a
single discourse about the idea of terrorism that presupposes the
right of intervention across the global stage.
Thus, Empire is legitimated on a new idea of right without limits.
Such a right to intervene-in economic, strategic, humanitarian
crises-necessarily undermines national sovereignty and the power
of nation-states as the building blocks of the international order. In
their place, Hardt and Negri point to an emerging transnational con-
sensus imbued with a sovereign legitimacy.8 This consensus emerges
from a series of global discourses-for example, on science, security,
human rights, and development-that motivate the framework for a
new global order. Hence, "Empire is not born of its own will but
rather is calledinto being and constituted on the basis of its capacity
to resolve conflicts." 9 Every pressure group, every demand, every
call on the highest powers-the monarchical powers, in Hardt and
Negri's framework-pushes forward a new moral, imperial order
overtaking the traditional sovereignty of states.
Empire s American Roots
In tracing the beginnings of Empire, Hardt and Negri turn to the
United States: the "contemporary idea of Empire is born through the
global expansion of the internal U.S. constitutional project."2 They
examine several aspects of the U.S. Constitution, particularly the
"tendency toward an open, expansive project operating on an
unbounded terrain.'
21
The notion of unboundedness appears throughout their analysis of
Empire, and they trace it back to the American experience. What
precisely is "unbounded" about this experience, however, is left un-
clear. Do they mean geographic unboundedness, in the sense of an
ever-shifting western frontier, or the idea of a political project that
does not recognize the distinction between inside and outside, based
on principles of universal scope?' The latter explanation conforms
or you are with the terrorists." Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Pledges Attack on Afghanistan
Unless it Surrenders Bin Laden Now, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at 1.
18. By sovereign here, Hardt and Negri borrow from Carl Schmitt the idea that sov-
ereignty is the right to "decide the exception," to intervene in the crisis for which 'normal' law
has no answer. See SCHMrr, supra note 7. See also AGAMBEN, supra note 7.
19. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 15.
20. Id. at 182. By "constitution" here they do not mean the literal constitutional text but
the broader idea of the constitution as understood in political theory, the established political
and social compact, the way in which the British have a constitution.
21. Id. at 161.
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better to their analysis of Empire, but does not necessarily fit lengthy
periods of American history nor does it comport with their emphasis
on terrain.
Hardt and Negri argue that Empire emerges from this American
experience with the organization of an open-ended space according
to central principles, which then are projected globally through the
liberal internationalism of Woodrow Wilson.' Wilsonian interna-
tionalism corresponds "to the original logic of the U.S. Constitution
and its idea of expansive Empire.' ' In this, our "American Cen-
tury," we should not be surprised to see our constitutional model
articulated globally in the new world order.
Yet, however much Empire may be indebted to the American con-
stitutional experience, Hardt and Negri maintain that we do not live
in an American empire. They resist seeing America as "the new
Rome," as many anti-globalization activists understand it, even while
they understand that it is "privileged" in Empire's development. This
denial of American hegemony seems driven by Hardt and Negri's
refusal of the idea of a "center" in what they argue is a center-less
global phenomenon; as a result, they fail to grapple with the Ameri-
can bias in global neoliberalism. We may recognize that "Empire" is
not politically centered around America while still demanding an
analysis of American influence over transnational media and capital
flows -a subject on which the authors have surprisingly little to say.
Empire and Capital
Hardt and Negri identify the same unbounded ambition in the
logic of capitalist expansion. Hardt and Negri outline in detail how
the logic of capital drives it towards global articulation, borrowing
from Marx's analysis of the global reach of capitalism. Capital knows
no limits and thrives by turning the outside into the inside, finding
new markets, new technologies, and new sources of labor. In that
process, it ultimately runs up against the limits established by nation-
al boundaries: "Historically, capital has relied on sovereignty and the
support of its structures of right and force, but those same structures
continually contradict in principle and obstruct in practice the oper-
ation of capital, finally obstructing its development."25 Hardt and
a modular expansion and operation over a literally unbounded, hence infinite, expanse. Both
are forms of openness and unboundedness, but one is the continual incorporation of the new
rather than the lack of limits.
23. In recent historical studies, too, Wilson appears the man of the new global order. See,
e.g., TONY SMITH, AMERICA'S MISSION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLDWIDE STRUG-
GLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994).
24. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 175.
25. Id at 327.
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Negri argue that we are in the passage from capital dependent on
sovereignty to capital globalized beyond the reach of national sov-
ereignty.26
Resistance to Empire
Empire draws a bleak portrait of the current global order as
radically opposed to human values and collective priorities. But
Hardt and Negri seek not only to describe Empire but also to uncov-
er the liberatory possibilities of globalization. They argue that while
we are driven to "globalization," we are not driven to this particular
form of it. Rather, we inhabit one of many possible globalisms-an
insight often missed in the discussion on "globalization." Their target
is not globalization but this form of it: "[The] enemy.., is a specific
regime of global relations that we call Empire."" A general stance a-
gainst globalization "obscures and even negates the real alternatives
and the potentials for liberation that exist within Empire."'
However, it remains unclear what room they leave for anti-im-
perial action, or even for independent human agency, since Empire
proceeds according to decentered logics independently of any unique
set of global actors. They argue that Empire generates its own
resistance: imperial advance emiserates and reconstitutes people in
new forms of subjectivity, and the restlessness of this "multitude" is
itself a form of resistance. Hardt and Negri celebrate the circulation
of people and ideas around the globe, praising hybridity, nomadism,
desertion, and miscegenation. 29 This circulation constitutes the new
global sociality on which Empire tenuously rests, seeking to cultivate
for its own ends and yet always needing to check its expansion
beyond the bounds of the imperial hierarchy.
Unfortunately, Hardt and Negri never explain how this restless-
ness translates into effective counter-imperial action. We may affirm
the new forms of sociality, production, and subjectivity accompany-
ing the transition to Empire, and even see them in significant tension
with the dominant order; but nevertheless, we may also think that a
meaningful challenge to Empire will require more than restless cre-
ativity alone.
Towards Counter-Empire
Hardt and Negri offer few concrete proposals for what they call
26. Of course, any observer of the recent international financial crises understands the in-
dependence of global capital from national controls. See. e.g., GIDDENS, supra note 3.
27. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 45-46.
28. Id. at 46.
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"Counter-Empire," declaring that imagining alternatives to Empire
can fall into an entrapping metaphysics, denying the power of people
to craft their own future: "Only the multitude through its practical
experimentation will offer the models and determine when and how
the possible becomes real."' Yet, they do suggest the broad outlines
on which initial struggles may take place, identifying three aims of
the struggle against Empire: global citizenship, a global basic income,
and the right of reappropriation of the new sources of productivity-
the electronic networks and knowledge industries. The right to
global citizenship allows the multitude to control its own movement,
enfranchising people in an age of massive, transnational migrations.
The right to a guaranteed basic income generalizes the idea of a "liv-
ing wage" beyond wage labor to include all productivity, all forms of
work, whether formally remunerative or not.31 Finally, Hardt and
Negri consider the right of reappropriation to mean free access and
public control of the new communicative media-the information
and knowledge industries.
What are we to make of this picture of Counter-Empire? The
concrete proposals appear to be a global projection and strengthen-
ing of existing social democratic restraints on capitalism already
operative in many advanced industrial countries. This is not a criti-
cism but a puzzle. If the first steps toward Counter-Empire are an
expansion of citizenship, a guaranteed income, and the public appro-
priation of the knowledge industries (public goods perhaps worthy of
public ownership in any event), is Counter-Empire anything other
than a deepened social democracy operative on a global stage? And
if so, why do Hardt and Negri insist on their revolutionary and
emancipatory Marxist rhetoric?32 Would not an approach that directs
piecemeal social change towards radical ends-"revolutionary re-
form" 33-better comport both with Hardt and Negri's call for global
social democracy and their respect for the indeterminacy of counter-
imperial action?
30. Id. at 411.
31. For more on the basic income, see ARGUING FOR A BASIC INCOME: ETHICAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR A RADICAL REFORM (Philippe van Parijs ed., 1992); ANDRE GORZ, A
CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC REASON (1989); MARKET SOCIALISM: THE CURRENT DEBATE
(Pranab Bardhan & John E. Roemer eds., 1993); PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR
ALL: WHAT (IF ANYTHING) CAN JUSTIFY CAPITALISM? (1995).
32. That is, given that there would be an overlapping consensus among liberals, radicals
and communists about their proposed move towards a more just form of globalization, why do
they employ a language that is bound to inhibit such a consensus?
33. For one approach to "revolutionary reform," see Roberto Mangabeira Unger's three-
volume work Politics, which presents a radical political theory that seeks to moderate the dis-
tinction between context-preserving conflict and revolutionary conflict in the idea of revolu-
tionary reform. For these themes, see in particular ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL
THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 163-64 (1987).
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Clearly, Hardt and Negri are weaker when it comes to proscrip-
tion. That said, Empire offers a provocative and theoretically sophis-
ticated description of globalization, a needed corrective to the
anodyne versions flooding the mainstream media. No wonder the
diverse cast of anti-globalization protestors have trouble locating a
coherent core to oppose when the struggle is rather to conceptualize
alternatives to Empire, especially when such alternatives must be
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